12/29/11

Manuel DeLanda: Immanent Patterns of Becoming

Great lecture series from Manuel on Youtube. He lectures about the relationship between immanence and transcendence, focusing primarily on the materialist world of Gilles Deleuze concept of immanence during a seminar called Gilles Deleuze and Science" at the European Graduate School in Saas-Fee, Switzerland. Manuel De Landa discussed the works of Henri Poinacaré and Réne Thom in relation to the topological thinking of Gilles Deleuze, specifically on differential calculus using topological thinking.

 

12/27/11

Overview: A Case Study of Complex Adaptive Systems Theory

Author(s) / Editor(s)

Stark, Bennett
This paper explains why self-adaptation does not explain the global political system at this time and postulate what conditions must be met if it did. Self-adaptation, if it were achieved and maintained in some proximate form, would constitute a phase transition.
Publication Reference
Published in/by
University of Ljubjlana & Wisdom
Date
July 2009
Web Location

Findings

1. The strong nation system is one in which no governance capacity exists to impose an
international rule of law.
2. The costs of failure in designing adaptive institutions may be irreversible.
3. The passing of our aggregate system into the complexity phase is a profound
evolutionary event with profound consequences. Complexity has generated the
likelihood that if current practices continue, multiple failures of our tightly coupled
political, economic, social systems could take place in this century.
The capacity of biological and ecological systems for self-adaptation or self-organization has been a significant theme in the current life-science academic literature. The article is a case study of complex adaptive systems theory, focusing upon the global political system as a part of a biophysical aggregate system in which we are embedded. This paper explains why self-adaptation does not explain the global political system at this time and postulate what conditions must be met if it did. Self-adaptation, if it were achieved and maintained in some proximate form, would constitute a phase transition.
Our species’ cumulative actions on the environment (including those generating global warming, environmental pollution, ozone depletion, and biodiversity loss) are the dominant source of the increasing density of causal connectedness between human and natural systems. Given the dramatic rise in the world’s population, technological growth--that affecting industrial practices, life-style behavior, and global trade and investment and military weaponry—is the underlying factor that has driven rising causal interconnectedness. I conjecture that the current density of connectedness constitutes a complexity phase into which humanity has entered. The rapidity with which the banking and economic collapse in the United States proliferated into a global recession contributes to my conjecture. Entering into the complexity phase is a profound non-genetically based evolutionary event with profound consequences. As a consequence, humanity is perilously close to what theoretical biologist Stuart Kauffman has called a “complexity catastrophe,” sharply limiting the capacity for self-adaptation, and in matters of global governance dramatically increasing the degree of difficulty of effective governance.
This paper focuses on the structural properties of the global political system and argue that its anarchic conditions are maladaptive. The anarchic quality of the strong nation system and the aggressive, self-maximizing behavior of the strong nation it generates serve to diminish the possibility of achieving sustainability. Moreover, the justification for aggressive, self-maximizing behavior within the strong nation system is weakened once in the complexity phase, and such behavior and its justification are no longer viable when a related conflict exists or emerges between global security and national security. The signature characteristic of global governance for global problems is that global security takes precedence over national security when a conflict arises.
The paper maintains that global governance for global problems is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the achievement of sustainable global governance, and is not likely to occur without strong nation advocacy. Sustainable global governance requires, among other things, the development and maintenance of resilience within and between our tightly-coupled human-made and natural systems.
Rising density of casual interconnectedness may generate a heightened concern for global problems creating, in turn, an unprecedented commonality of interests among nations, especially strong nations, and their respective citizens. Should global “localization” occur, it would produce a veritable compression of ideational space characterized by fewer differences in policy prescriptions between (and within) nations. We would expect the emergence of vocal interest groups and revitalized, if not new constituencies, sympathetic to an ethos that extends beyond the narrow self-interest of the strong nation system. Such a compression might parallel the characteristics of the small world network. However, the likelihood is that a struggle for power between those advocating narrow self-interest within the strong nation system and those favoring a wider and global interest, will undoubtedly playout, and no one can predict in advance its outcome.
Economic globalization has contributed to the dense, causal interconnectedness both within and between nations. The management of the global economy in accordance with neo-liberal policies reflect the distribution of power within the strong nation system. These policies with their embrace of market fundamentalism have had destabilizing, global effects, especially upon third world nations.

Overview of: The Parable of the Tribes

A new look at how the history of civilization may have been largely shaped by the raw struggle for power between societies


Author(s) / Editor(s)

Schmookler, Andrew Bard


Publication Reference
“The parable of the tribes” is used to describe schematically how one aggressive tribe among an otherwise peaceful group can force the spread of the “ways of power” throughout the system: power becomes a contaminant that, once introduced, becomes universal abetted and magnified through innovations in organization and technology.
Published in/by
Governance, page 5.
Date
Autumn 1984

Findings

  • The evolution of civilization can be seen as a dialectic between the commonsense view of a benign striving for and choice of a humane world and a more problematic systematic selection for power and dominance over others.
  • “The parable of the tribes” is used to describe schematically how one aggressive tribe among an otherwise peaceful group can force the spread of the “ways of power” throughout the system: power becomes a contaminant that, one introduced, becomes universal abetted and magnified through innovations in organization and technology.
  • The drive for societal survival makes the selection for power among civilized societies inevitable.
  • The synthesis of the compulsive spread of power with the benign choice for the diffusion of beneficial inventions through human and humane aspirations is possible. These “different truths” need to be combined in a balanced way.
The commonsense view of social evolution as the product of choices made in the marketplace of cultural possibilities resulting in the continuous betterment of the human condition is flawed.
The rise of civilization, paradoxically, reduced the natural limits separating societies. In such a situation, Schmookler's Parable of the Tribes describes how, in a situation in which two or more actors desire to exploit a limited resource, power becomes important and a contaminant of the possibility of peaceful co-existence:
All of a group of tribes living within reach of each other choose peace. However, if all but one choose peace, there are four possibilities for the threatened neighbors:
  • Destruction.
  • Absorption and enslavement.
  • Withdrawal to a less desirable place.
  • Imitation of the aggressive behavior.
Technological innovation and “improvement,” far from making things inevitably better, can extend the reach of aggressors throughout the world.
Cultural homogenization and the diminishment of diversity happens both through benign, commonsense choice (i.e., innovations as improvements) as well as through compulsion by dominant aggressors.

Overview: Social Dilemmas: The Anatomy of Cooperation

Author(s) / Editor(s)

Kollock, Peter
Kollock provides a literature review and taxonomy of social dilemma models and social dilemma solutions, as well as current issues and future directions of studying social dilemmas.

Publication Reference

Published in/by
Annual Review of Sociology, 24: 183-214
Date
August 1998

Findings

  • Social dilemmas reflect a ‘deficient equilibrium’ because there is at least another outcome in which everyone is better off, but nobody has an incentive to change their behavior. Shaping and managing incentives is critical for shifting out of situations of deficient equilibrium. It's an equilibrium because two players, in the absence of certainty about how the other is going to act, choose the least damaging strategy for themselves -- assuming that the other will defect – and their strategies, taken together, represent a logical balance. It's a deficient balance because if they each had chosen to cooperate, their strategies, taken together, would have paid off better for both.
  • If you reward individuals, they have less incentive to work as a group, but if you reward only the group, they have no choice but to work for the common goal.
  • Moving from 2 person to N person dilemmas crosses a threshold in which anonymity becomes possible and free riding becomes more significant because not all actions are transparent to all actors. As N increases the costs one can impose on those who fail to cooperate are diffused and diluted, thus having less impact.
  • Three mythic narratives have shaped research and thinking about social dilemmas: the prisoner’s dilemma, the creation of public goods, and the tragedy of the commons. While these narratives can limit our thinking, they point to three critical challenges for overcoming social dilemmas: developing trust to secure transactions, overcoming the “social fence” of incurring immediate individual cost to generate a shared benefit (or public good), and overcoming the temptation to obtain immediate individual benefit that produces a shared cost for others.
  • The role of communication is significant in shaping cooperation with the context of prisoner’s dilemmas. Information gathering about behaviors, explicit promises regarding future behavior, persuasion, and the ability to establish group identity are all critical communication activities that increase the likelihood of cooperation.
  • The expectation of reciprocity can effect situations and moderate temptations to defect (free ride or abuse commons). The expectation of in-group reciprocity (if you think someone is going to participate, you will) seems to serve as a very deep heuristic that shapes strategic decisions about social dilemmas.
  • Cooperation rates are tied to payoff structures; changing the payoff structure or clearly communicating it can change the level of cooperation. Cooperation rates increase as payoffs increase, even when they just increase for others. If a dilemma is structured such that individuals have an effect on the outcome, the cooperation rate can increase.
  • Transforming social dilemmas is sometime more effective, and easier, than trying to solve them as they exist. For example, increasing communication or sense of affiliation (group identity) can transform a prisoner’s dilemma to an assurance game and increase the likelihood of cooperation. Looking for way to transform the context and nature of the dilemma is another important path for solving social dilemmas.
  • Some people are, by nature, more likely to trust others. In order to solve both the first-order dilemma (how to agree to organize collective action) and the second order dilemma (who’s going to police the agreement), you need both kinds of people: the more trusting people are necessary in order to make an agreement, and the less trusting people are necessary in order to police the agreement.
“The study of social dilemmas is the study of the tension between individual and collective rationality. In a social dilemma, individually reasonable behavior leads to a situation in which everyone is worse off. The first part of this review is a discussion of categories of social dilemmas and how they are modeled.” The Prisoner’s Dilemma, the problem of providing public goods, and Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons are three powerful metaphors that facilitated and structured research but also served as blinders since their limitations are often not recognized.
Models:
Kollock’s analysis divides dilemmas into two-person and N-person dilemmas. The key two-person dilemmas are the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Assurance Game, and the Chicken Game. Each of these models is defined by the ordering of four possible outcomes: mutual cooperation, mutual defection, and either first or second person’s unilateral defection. Each of these outcomes generates an individual benefit for each person and is ordered by the benefit for the first person.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma models unsecured transactions, e.g. buying and selling over the Internet. The best outcome of a Prisoner’s Dilemma is unilateral defection of the first person, followed by mutual cooperation, mutual defection, and the worst outcome is the first person’s unilateral cooperation. Since defection has the highest potential benefit and cooperation the highest potential risk, the equilibrium of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is mutual defection. This equilibrium is deficient because the best outcome for both players is mutual cooperation.
The Assurance Game is similar to the Prisoner’s Dilemma except it models situations where mutual cooperation is more benefical for each player than unilateral defection, e.g. a project that requires collaboration. This extra motivation to mutually cooperate creates two equilibria, one optimal, which is mutual cooperation, and one deficient, which is mutual defection. The optimal equilibrium requires trust between the two persons sufficient to assure each other that the other will cooperate. Insufficient trust leads to the deficient equilibrium.
The Chicken Game is again similar to the Prisoner's Dilemma except mutual defection is the worst outcome, worse than unilateral cooperation. This replaces the Prisoner’s Dilemma’s mutual defection equilibrium by two equilibria, unilateral defection and unilateral cooperation because of the strong motivation to not mutually defect. The Chicken Game is a model for situations that require volunteer effort to avoid the worst outcome but where duplicate effort is less desirable.
Kollock divides N-person dilemmas into two types based on cost and benefit for each individual. The first type is known as the social fence,s where an individual is presented with an immediate cost that generates a benefit shared by all. The individual wants to avoid the cost but if all do, everyone is worse off. A common metaphor of the social fence is the provisioning of public goods, which are (to a varying degree) non-excludable and nonrival. The key characteristic of a public good dilemma is the production function which defines the relationship between the level of resources contributed and the level of public good provided. Production functions are classified into decelarating, linear, accelerating, and step functions. Various production functions can produce N-person versions of any of the 2-person dilemmas.
The second type is know as social trap where the “individual is tempted by an immediate benefit that produces a cost to all. If all succumb to the temptation, the outcome is a collective disaster.” The usual metaphor of the social trap is the tragedy of the commons. A key feature of commons dilemmas is that the benefits are non-excludable (or difficult to make excludable) and subtractable. The key characteristic of commons dilemmas is the carrying capacity of the commons which depends on the replenishment rate of the subtractable joint resource.
Important (but not inevitable) features that affect N-person dilemma dynamics and contrast them to two-person dilemmas are anonymity, diffusion of defection cost, and little or no direct control on others. Some of these features are also found in two-person dilemmas, e.g. blaming defection on out-of-control circumstances is a form of anonymity in two-person games.
Solutions:
“The second part of [Kollock’s paper] is an extended treatment of possible solutions for social dilemmas. These solutions are organized into three broad categories based on whether the solutions assume egoistic actors and whether the structure of the situation can be changed: Motivational solutions assume actors are not completely egoistic and so give some weight to the outcomes of their partners. Strategic solutions assume egoistic actors, and neither of these categories of solutions involve changing the fundamental structure of the situation. Solutions that do involve changing the rules of the game are [called] structural solutions.”
The motivation of not completely egoistic actors to cooperate is influenced by social value orientation, communication, and group identity. The social value orientation of a person seems to be acquired from the person’s social environment and is some linear combination of a cooperator who tries to maximize joint outcome, a competitor who tries to maximize own outcome relative to partner, and an individualist who tries to maximize own outcome. Kollock does not find any conclusive results in how to influence social value orientation but does find evidence that it varies between different countries.
The presence of communication positively affects cooperation rates. Communication enables a person to find out about others’ choices, to make explicit commitments, to appeal to what is the moral thing to do, and most importantly, to create or reinforce a sense of group identity. The effect of group identity is in fact so strong that it can affect cooperation rates even in the absence of communication. In-group behavior of individuals frequently includes personal restraint and treating Prisoner’s Dilemma situations as Assurance Games. However, in-group behavior implies out-group behavior with the potential to cause severe social costs due to intergroup conflicts.
“[Strategic solutions] rely on the ability of [egoistic] actors to shape to shape the outcomes and hence behavior of other actors. For this reason, many of these strategic solutions are limited to repeated two-person dilemmas.” Axelrod (see The Evolution of Cooperation) identifies three requirements for strategic solutions: ongoing relationships between actors (i.e. all expect shared dilemmas in their future), ability to identify each other, and ability to keep track of the other’s past behavior.
The most successful strategy in iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma tournaments (everyone against everyone) that meet these requirements is Tit-for-Tat which starts out with cooperation and then matches the partner’s previous behavior. This strategy transforms a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma into a repeated Assurance Game since the only long-term outcome of this strategy is either mutual cooperation or mutual defection (the two equilibria of the Assurance Game). Key aspects of successful strategies in repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma tournaments are (1) to realize that it is not a zero-sum game hence does not benefit from a competitive social orientation (“don’t be envious”), (2) to not defect first, (3) to reciprocate both cooperation and defection, and (4) to be predictable so that the partner clearly understands one's strategy. One important caveat is that repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma tournaments assume perfect communication. In real life where communication is often imperfect more generous or forgiving strategies can avoid accidental cycles of recrimination.
Recent evidence suggests that the strategy of choosing partners is more important than the strategy used within a dilemma. In a modified version of iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma tournament actors can exit current relationships and choose alternative partners. A very successful strategy in this environment is Out-for-Tat which exits a relationship as soon as the partner defects. A more forgiving version that gives a defecting partner a second chance is even more successful.
Strategies for N-person dilemmas involve grim triggers, social learning, and group reciprocity. In a “grim trigger” strategy an individual only cooperates if all other group members cooperate and defects as soon as one other group member defects. Social learning is the basis of a cognitively less taxing class of strategies that involves imitating other group members and look for thresholds in public good provisioning instead of calculating marginal rates of return or figuring out dominating strategies. Group identity increases cooperation rates because group members follow strategies that assume that all members share a strong expectation of group reciprocity (reciprocity within the group).
Structural solutions change the rules of the dilemma thereby changing or eliminating it. One approach is to reinforce prerequisites for strategic solutions by introducing long-term accountability (shadow of the future) that influences individual reputations. However, accountability and reputation are not sufficient to escape the Prisoner’s Dilemma’s equilibrium of mutual defection (in two- or N-person version) if the means to encourage cooperation are too weak (e.g. production function for public good too flat or too much effort required to reach provisioning point).
Many people seem to positively weigh others’ outcomes since cooperation increases significantly as the benefits to others from one’s cooperation increase. Cooperation levels are also higher if group members are asked to contribute to a non-divisible public good that only benefits the whole group, probably due to an increased sense of group identity (see group reciprocity).
Cooperation in N-person dilemmas increases if individual contributions have (or are perceived to have) a discernable effect, i.e. make an efficacious contribution. For public goods with step-level production function one can create a minimal subgroup that requires every member to contribute in order to reach the provisioning point or let two groups compete for contributions, turning an N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma into an N-person Chicken Game. Another example are "matching grants" or "adopting" an individual from a large group of benefactors.
Increasing group size makes defection more anonymous and increases the cost of organizing. However, research results on cooperation depending on group size alone are inconclusive. In the case of highly non-rival goods with a threshold production function a larger group is more likely to contain a "critical mass" of cooperating individuals. Diversity of group members' interests and resources encourages formation of critical mass.
A common structural strategy for N-person dilemmas is the creation of boundaries in an attempt to make public goods or commons more excludable. There are three main approaches: The first one is to institute an external authority or trusted leader to govern access to commons. This approach appears to be less preferable if other structural changes are possible. Establishing an external authority can raise severe problems of justice, enforcement, corruption, and scalability. The second approach is to break up commons into private parcels assuming that individuals will take better care of own property than common property. However, privatization does not work for non-divisible goods, raises the social question of who gets to own commons, does not prevent owners to routinely destroy their own property (“tragedy of enclosure”), and requires institutional support to enforce private property rights. A third approach is to locally regulate “access to and use of common property by those who actually use and have local knowledge of the resource.” One key characteristic of successful and long-lasting local regulations is clearly defined boundaries.
Sanctions are a structural method to encourage cooperation where the outcomes themselves of N-person dilemmas are too weak of a motivator. However, the implementation of sanctions can be very expensive. Local monitoring and sanctioning systems are more practical and less costly. Another way to reduce cost is to use a graduated system of sanctions with low-cost conflict resolution. A sanctioning system is itself a public good and therefore poses a second-order dilemma. Communities with a high level of trust readily cooperate in a first-order dilemma but cooperate less in a second-order dilemma hence are less willing to support a sanctioning system. The opposite is true for communities with a high level of distrust.

Overview of The Evolution of Cooperation

Author(s) / Editor(s)

Axelrod, Robert
"The objective of this enterprise is to develop a theory of cooperation that can be used to discover what is necessary for cooperation to emerge."

Publication Reference

Published in/by
Basic Books
Date
August 1, 1985

Findings

  • The emergence of cooperation can be seen as a consequence of agents pursuing their own interests. It is not necessary to assume that those agents are more honest, more generous, or more cooperative per se.
  • What makes it possible for cooperation to emerge is the fact that the agents might interact again. The choice made now of whether or not to cooperate will affect choices made in later interactions. This called the 'shadow of the future.' The shadow of the future can exist even when the participants are unaware of it, as is the case in biological cooperation (symbiosis).
  • No best rule exists independently of the strategy being used by others. Despite this fact, robust strategies, useful in many contexts, are possible.
  • The evolution of cooperation requires high levels of reciprocal interactions between agents. The absolute number of agents can be small as long as their interactions are numerous.
  • Communities of cooperation, once established, can protect themselves from 'invasion' by less cooperative strategies. "The gear wheels of social evolution have a ratchet."
  • The winning tit-for-tat strategy:
    1. Don't be envious. Don't compare your success to others, only to your own strategic possibilities, i.e. are you employing the best strategy you have?
    2. Don't be the first to defect. Cooperate as long as others are cooperating.
    3. Reciprocate both cooperation and defection. Enforcing the rules is as important as playing by them.
    4. Be transparent. In order for others to coordinate their choices with yours, they have to understand your behavior. Keep it simple and out in the open.
  • Ways to promote cooperation:
    1. Enlarge the shadow of the future. Increase the permanence of cooperative choices or the frequency of interactions.
    2. Change the payoffs. Make the long-term incentives to cooperate greater than the short-term incentives to defect.
    3. Socialize reciprocal cooperation as a norm. Teach people to cooperate first.
    4. Improve collective memory. Collective memory, or culture, is embedded in institutions. Provide access to collective memory.
  • The foundation of cooperation is the durability of the relationship, which allows agents to learn about each other in order to cooperate.
Chapter 1, The Problem of Cooperation. Why do people (or other actors) cooperate? "The objective of this enterprise is to develop a theory of cooperation that can be used to discover what is necessary for cooperation to emerge." It uses the Prisoner's Dilemma as a framework for testing theories about balancing self-interest and competition.
"In the Prisoners' Dilemma, the strategy that works best depends directly on what strategy the other player is using and, in particular, on whether this strategy leaves room for the development of mutual cooperation."
Chapter 2, TIT FOR TAT. "The iterated Prisoners' Dilemma has become the E. Coli of social psychology," yet people have not paid much attention to how to play the game well. Axelrod organized a computer tournament to which people familiar with PD submitted programs encoding different strategies. The winner was one of the simplest, TIT FOR TAT.
Axelrod then constructed an environment in which different programs competed, and the losing programs were eliminated: this was an ecology that rewarded high scoring programs, and punished others. "This process simulates survival of the fittest. A rule that is successful on average with the current distribution of rules in the population will become an even larger proportion of the environment of the other rules in the next generation. At first, a rule that is successful with all sorts of rules will proliferate, but later as the unsuccessful rules disappear, success requires good performance with other successful rules." In other words, the competition gets tougher.
"The analysis of the tournament results indicate that there is a lot to be learned about coping in an environment of mutual power. Even expert strategists from political science, sociology, economics, psychology, and mathematics made the systematic errors of being too competitive for their own good, not being forgiving enough, and being too pessimistic about the responsiveness of the other side."
The tournaments reveal that "there is a single property which distinguishes the relatively high-scoring entries from the relatively low-scoring entries. This is the property of being nice, which is to say never being the first to defect."
TIT FOR TAT's rules for success:
  • Be nice. Don't be the first to go on the attack. This demonstrates good will, and avoids provoking others.
  • Retaliate. If others attack, retaliate. Not doing so encourages bad behavior and gives niceness a bad reputation.
  • Be forgiving. If others defect but then go back to cooperating, accept the opportunity to move back to a cooperative mode.
  • Be clear. Others can predict what you'll do, be certain that their moves will have definite outcomes. "There is an important contrast between a zero-sum game like chess and a non-zero-sum game like the iterated PD. In chess, it is useful to keep the other player guessing about your intentions. The more the other player is in doubt, the less efficient will be his or her strategy. But in a non-zero-sum setting it does not always pay to be so clever. In the iterate PD, you benefit from the other player's cooperation."
Chapter 4, Trench Warfare. During World War I, "live and let live" arrangements emerged spontaneously between opposing units on the Western Front. Cooperation could take hold because "the same small units faced each other in immobile sectors for extended periods of time." Consequently, they had a more sustained relationship than in mobile warfare, and could develop commonly-understood rules, reciprocity and restraint in attacks, displays of strength (e.g., snipers shooting at hard targets)as well as ethics (recognition that there was an arrangement and violating it was immoral) and rituals (e.g., regular artillery firing).
"Cooperation first emerged spontaneously in a variety of contexts, such as restraint in attacking the distribution of enemy rations, a pause during the first Christmas in the trenches, and a slow resumption of fighting after bad weather made sustained combat almost impossible. These restraints quickly evolved into clear patterns of mutually understood behavior, such as two-for-one or three-for-one retaliation for actions that were taken to be unacceptable."
Chapter 6, How to Choose Effectively. Four suggestions about how to do well in PD:
  • Don't be envious. In a PD, "envy is self-destructive. Asking how well you are doing compared to how well the other player is doing is not a good standard unless your goal is to destroy the other player." However, in an iterated prisoner's dilemma, you can't do better than the other player, unless they're always suckers. "In a non-zero-sum world you do not have to do better than the other player to do well for yourself. The other's success is virtually a prerequisite of your doing well for yourself."
  • Don't be the first to defect (be nice). "It pays to cooperate as long as the other player is cooperating." In a short game, defection can make sense; but in a relationship, taking advantage of the other person is self-defeating.
  • Reciprocate both cooperation and defection. TIT FOR TAT "does not destroy the basis of its own success. On the contrary, it thrives on interactions with other successful rules." However, the right level of forgiveness depends on the context, and the other players' strategies.
  • Don't be too clever. "In a zero-sum game, such as chess it pays for us to be as sophisticated and as complex in our analysis as we can. Non-zero-sum games are not like this. The other player can respond to your own choices. And unlike the chess opponent, the other player in a PD should not be regarded as someone who is out to defeat you." "There is an important contrast between a zero-sum game like chess and a non-zero-sum game like the iterated PD. In chess, it is useful to keep the other player guessing about your intentions. The more the other player is in doubt, the less efficient will be his or her strategy. But in a non-zero-sum setting it does not always pay to be so clever. In the iterate PD, you benefit from the other player's cooperation."
Chapter 7, How to Promote Cooperation. Promoting cooperation can be thought of as an exercise in tinkering with the variables in a PD. "As long as the interaction is not iterated, cooperation is very difficult. That is why an important way to promote cooperation is to arrange that the same two individuals will meet each other again, be able to recognize each other from the past, and to recall how the other has behaved until now."
  • Enlarge the shadow of the future. For cooperation to emerge, players must be in a continuing relationship, with the expectation that it will continue in the future. "Mutual cooperation can be stable if the future is sufficiently important relative to the past." "There are two basic ways of doing this: by making the interactions more durable, and by making them more frequent. [P]rolonged interaction allows patterns of cooperation which are based on reciprocity to be worth trying and allows them to become established," Making interactions more frequent makes "the next interaction occur sooner, and hence the next move looms larger than it otherwise would." You might do this by enforcing isolation, or constructing hierarchies or organizations, which are "especially effective at concentrating the interactions between specific individuals."
  • Change the payoffs. Make defection less attractive, by enforcing laws, or growing the value of long-term incentives.
  • Teach people to care about each other.
  • Teach reciprocity. Reciprocity "actually helps not only oneself, but others as well. It helps others by making it hard for exploitative strategies to survive."
  • Improve recognition abilities. "The ability to recognize the other player from past interactions, and to remember the relevant features of those interactions, is necessary to sustain cooperation. Without these abilities, a player could not use any form of reciprocity and hence could not encourage the other to cooperate."
Chapter 8, The Social Structure of Cooperation.
The social structure of cooperation involves labels, reputation, regulation, and territoriality.
  • Labels are fixed characteristics of an agent that are observable by other agents. Labels affect reciprocity and retaliation via assumptions of group similarity and stereotypes.
  • Reputation is others' belief about the strategies an agent will employ. Reputation may be based on past behavior or on rumours, i.e. reputation can be accurate or merely believed. Reputation affects whether or not other agents will cooperate or defect with you.
  • Regulation involves setting the stringency of a standard of behavior "high enough to get most of the social benefits of regulation, and not so high as to prevent the evolution of a stable pattern of voluntary compliance from almost all of the companies" (or regulated agents).
  • Territoriality refers to both physical and conceptual spaces that can be 'invaded' by agents of differing strategies. Territoriality establishes boundaries within which behaviors will be reinforced or retaliated against depending on prevailing norms. Also, the boundary provides an 'inside' for agents that comply with the norms, and an 'outside' to which they can be expelled if they do not comply.
Chapter 9, The Robustness of Reciprocity.
  • Cooperation can get started by even a small cluster of individuals who are willing to reciprocate cooperation, even in a world where no one else will cooperate.
  • Once cooperation is establish, it protects itself from invasion by non-cooperative strategies.
  • The foundation of cooperation is the durability of the relationship, which allows agents to learn about each other in order to cooperate.

Overview of "When Push comes To Pull: The New Economy and Culture of Networking Technology"

Summary of: When Push comes To Pull: The New Economy and Culture of Networking Technology

Author(s) / Editor(s)

Bollier, David
Information and communication technology innovation have begun to transform commercial business and social institutions from a "push" technology approach (hierarchical "center out"), to a "pull" technology approach (networked -based and decentralized). This poses new challenges to social, political, and educational systems that are largely designed to support "push" economies.

Publication Reference

Published in/by
The Aspen Institute
Date
2006

Findings

  • We are living in an epochal period of transition bridging two very different types of economies and cultures. We are transitioning from a "push" economy: that tries to anticipate consumer demand, and then creates a standardized product, and "pushes the product into the market and culture, using standardized distribution channels and marketing. We are transitioning to a "pull" economy: open and flexible production platforms that use network technologies to coordinate many different entities from disparate regions.. "Pull" economies produce customized products and services that serve localized needs (demand-driven), usually in a rapid manner.
  • "Pull" networks tend to build the capabilities of their networked partners, by providing performance feedback and sharing best practices among the network participants. "Pull" platforms therefore tend to better employ the enthusiasm of all of the participants.
  • The "pull" phenomenon is not confined to business/online commerce. The spread of common use of internet technologies is finding "pull" techniques being applied in entertainment, social life, politics, education, and government.
  • "Pull" models are going to change the way that governments create policy as more companies gravitate toward them.
This paper is a summary of an Aspen Institute sponsored in-depth roundtable session, written from the perspective of one informed conference observer (Bollier). The participants are leading thinkers in the many complex areas this paper covers (economics, systems theory, human behavior, human futures, information technology evolution, etc) and are listed on page 57. A selection of their key insights shared in the paper are listed below:
A "push" economy is geared towards mass production, anticipating consumer demand, and routing resources to the right place at the right time, to create standardized and mass produced products. By contrast, a "pull" economy is based on open, flexible production platforms that are used to orchestrate a broad range of resources. Instead of producing standardized products, "pull" model companies are demand-driven, and assemble products in customized ways that serve specialized or local needs, usually using "rapid" or "on the fly" processes.
Several global corporations are moving towards "pull" methods, and away from "push" models; ie., Toyota, Dell, Cisco, Li & Fung. These companies employ different variations of Value Network models, that share information about overall network performance and best practices for serving specialized needs, among hundreds or even thousands of partner companies that make up the network. This creates an intra-network knowledge commons. Some companies also work closely with Open Source Software projects, thereby expanding their "pull" network, and expanding their knowledge commons into a broader Open Commons via Open Source Software project contributions. Thus, "pull" business models also tend to be Network Value-Increasing, and Commons-based business models as well.
"Pull" models can also be platforms for creating "increasing returns dynamics." This is due to "pull" models being based around loose and flexible networks that are already configured to scale as growth occurs. So, growth does not incur the huge overhead costs in administration that "push" models must contend with. Pull platform key characteristics include modular and loosely-coupled networks, open channels that better harness the passion and commitment of innovation communities. "Pull" platforms also will tend to influence public policy with regards to education and innovation, as more companies tend to gravitate towards the "pull" models.
The areas where "push" models tend to succeed in business are in areas where people do not know what they want, and prefer to shop from pre-made selections (Ikea, Home Depot). However, there are even "pull" models to found here, in the form of user-driven innovation, such as mountain biking, extreme skiing, hot rodding, etc. In these pro-amateur niches, customers don't necessarily know what they want, but do want to be a participant in the "pull" network that creates the product.
How do you tax a product that is made in 23 different countries? "Pull" models are going to change the way that governments create policy as more companies gravitate toward them. This will influence laws about intellectual property, education, taxation and more.
"Pull" economies are not just centered around finding creative ways to "outsource/offshore jobs" away from one place and to the places where "labor" is "cheaper". Successful "pull" models have encouraged and aided "insourcing", where more jobs are created, for instance in the United States by "foreign sources (a total of 7 million cited by this paper), than are out sourced (a total of 600,000+ cited by this paper). This is because pull models seek out, not just the "cheapest" labor, but the best ways to add value to the production networks. So, they can scale to many participants around the world, regardless of local labor costs, to find the best participants needed for specific specialized productions.
The social dynamics of "pull" models are highly centered around creating relationships of trust, sharing knowledge, and close cooperation among network participants. In "pull" models, non-market value creation (tacit knowledge, intangible value) is generally steered towards a commons-based model. A commons is used as a "collective governance regime for managing shared resources sustainably and equitably." Many of these commons are made possible by networked information technologies (the internet).
Bollier suggests that "if online commons are going to be useful to business, companies will need to do more work to develop protocols for identity and reputation management". This is because the use of the commons is based around trust. It also due to the need for ways to measure qualitative value in intangible assets beyond money, like knowledge, individual performance and value multiplication, and network wide performance/value multiplication.
Roundtable participants also noted that "pull" models will pose challenges to current education regimes that are centered around training people to participate in "push" economies. One of the participants mentions that " Computers, software tools, and Internet resources make possible some radically new styles of learning. By using pull-based systems, students can function much like businesses in the pull environment: They can access resources they don't control and put themselves into flows of activity, rather than just building inventories of static, objectified "knowledge."

Overview of Ostram's "Governing the Commons"


Summary of: Governing The Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

Author(s) / Editor(s)

Ostrom, Elinor
Any group that attempts to manage a common resource (e.g., aquifers, judicial systems, pastures) for optimal sustainable production must solve a set of problems in order to create institutions for collective action; there is some evidence that following a small set of design principles in creating these institutions can overcome these problems.

Publication Reference

Published in/by
Cambridge University Press
Date
1990

Findings

  • People are trapped by the Prisoner's Dilemma only if they treat themselves as prisoners by passively accepting the suboptimum strategy the dilemma locks them into, but if they try to work out a contract with the other players, or find the ones most likely to cooperate, or agree on rules for punishing cheaters, or artificially change the incentive ratios - they can create an institution for collective action that benefits them all. This resonates with Peter Kollock's taxonomy of strategies for dealing with social dilemmas - one strategy is to change the rules of the game.
  • Changing the rules of the game to turn zero-sum games into non-zero-sum games may be one way to describe the arc of civilization for the past 8000 years: using symbolic media and social inventions, people have created institutions for collective action since the emergence of agriculture spurred the invention of writing. But for the most part, we've overcome obstacles and built these institutions blindly, without any systematic knowledge about how the game works. Ostrom takes an empirical approach: By examining legal records and other public documents, is it possible to determine whether every population overconsumes and under-provisions all common pool resource? She found that in many different cultures all over the world, some groups would find ways to overcome the obstacles that defeated others - by creating contracts, agreements, incentives, constitutions, signals, media to enable cooperation for mutual benefit.
  • Social dilemmas of multiple dimensions are obstacles on the path to creating institutions for collective action; these dilemmas must be overcome if institutions are to succeed or exist at all. Lack of information about the system can be an obstacle to agreement among the individuals who make up the system.Systemic information about salinization of wells was an obstacle to water-sharing agreements in California; individual water-users knew whether their wells were pumping salt, but none of them had compiled the information to see the overall pattern in the watershed, and no individual was willing to pay the price of gathering it. In this case, the US Geographic Survey had the data, thus overcoming this obstacle. Another obstacle, free-riding, creates the second order social dilemma concerning who will bear the cost of policing the rules once they are agreed upon. So although the overall formula is simple - social dilemmas can be solved through institutions for collective action that are built by overcoming known obstacles - in practice, each group that struggles to build an institution works under the handicap of being largely unaware of knowledge about how such institutions succeed and fail.
  • In comparing the communities, Ostrom found that groups that are able to organize and govern their behavior successfully are marked by the some basic design principles:
    • Group boundaries are clearly defined.
    • Rules governing the use of collective goods are well matched to local needs and conditions.
    • Most individuals affected by these rules can participate in modifying the rules.
    • The rights of community members to devise their own rules is respected by external authorities.
    • A system for monitoring member's behavior exists; the community members themselves undertake this monitoring.
    • A graduated system of sanctions is used.
    • Community members have access to low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms.
    • For CPRs that are parts of larger systems: appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.

Definitions

The commons is a general term for shared resources in which each stakeholder has an equal interest. Studies on the commons include the information commons with issues about public knowledge, the public domain, open science, and the free exchange of ideas -- all issues at the core of a direct democracy.
Common-pool resources (CPRs) are natural or human-made resources where one person's use subtracts from another's use and where it is often necessary, but difficult and costly, to exclude other users outside the group from using the resource.. The majority of the CPR research to date has been in the areas of fisheries, forests, grazing systems, wildlife, water resources, irrigation systems, agriculture, land tenure and use, social organization, theory (social dilemmas, game theory, experimental economics, etc.), and global commons (climate change, air pollution, transboundary disputes, etc.), but CPR's can also include the broadcast spectrum.

Issues

Whenever a group of people depend on a resource that everybody uses but nobody owns, and where one person's use effects another person's ability to use the resource, either the population fails to provide the resource, overconsumes and/or fails to replenish it, or they construct an institution for undertaking and managing collective action. The common pool resource (CPR) can be a fishery, a grazing ground, the Internet, the electromagnetic spectrum, a park, the air, scientific knowledge. The institution can be a body of informal norms that are disseminated by word of mouth, enforced by gossip or religious stricture, and passed from one generation to another, or a body of formal written laws that are enforced by state agencies, or a marketplace that treats the resource as private property, or a mixture of these forms. In the real world of fishing grounds and wireless competition, CPR institutions that succeed are those that survive, and those that fail sometimes cause the resource to disappear (e.g., salmon in the Pacific Northwest).
Elinor Ostrom's founding role in the evolution of an interdiscipline of cooperation studies grew from her challenge to currently accepted wisdom about institutions for collective action, her careful inductive examination of empirical studies of common pool resource management, and her insistence on interdisciplinary analysis. The dynamics she uncovered in her research - seven principles common to most successful, enduring common pool resource arrangements - are the starting point for anyone who wants to know how careful theoretical and experimental work can provide practical guidance for policy.
"The word commons originally denoted pastureland treated as a common resource, where individual herders were free to graze their sheep or cattle. The land can support a limited number of grazing animals. The temptation to graze more than one's share is a rational strategy for an individual herder. But if all succumb to the same temptation, the grass ceases to grow and the value of the pasture to everybody disappears."
In a 1986 lecture, Elinor Ostrom challenged the inexorable inevitability of Hardin's tragedy, noting that the situation described in Garrett Hardin's classic 1968 paper "The Tragedy of the Commons" has "the same underlying structure as the decision facing each prisoner in the so-called Prisoner's dilemma game." She also wrote:
"The Prisoner's Dilemma game has fascinated scholars in many fields. The paradox that individually rational strategies lead to collectively irrational outcomes seems to challenge a fundamental faith that rational human beings can achieve rational results. In the introduction to a recently published book, Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation, Richmond Campbell explains the "deep attraction" of the dilemma".
In her 1986 lecture, Ostrom emphasized the connection between the tragedy of the commons and the Prisoner's Dilemma game, but had the scientific curiosity to inquire whether tragically locked-in Prisoner's Dilemma strategies actually constrained human choice in all cases where humans have documented their use of common pool resources - she shrewdly understand that the cases in which people overcame the barriers to collective action are as important as the cases in which they fail:
"Scholars and government officials presume that all participants in situations with the structure of a PD game are necessarily trapped in the structure of the situation; as prisoners are trapped in their cells, participants are themselves trapped in their own mental apparatus. I shall argue that the structure is conceptually and methodologically necessary for analysis, but not an empirical necessity. The inability of participants to change the structure may be an empirical reality in some situations. It is not an empirical reality in many situations, however."
Ostrom argued from well-documented cases of informal institutions that had evolved into formal if localized arrangements, sometimes lasting for centuries, that groups could evolve effective institutions without externally coercive authority - if they could solve the "common set of problems." The design principles that Ostrom extracted from cases of successful CPR management turned out to be missing from most of the cases of failed CPR management she investigated - evidence that these design principles are clues to solutions to the problems preventing collective action in many instances. Ostrom argued forcefully that neither direct intervention by the state nor total privatization are necessary for people to evolve successful institutions - although state-provided courts lower the costs of creating the institutions, and the market value of well-managed CPRs provides strong incentive to create, agree, and maintain such arrangements.

Conclusions

Ostrom claims that "all efforts to organize collective action, whether by an external ruler, an entrepreneur, or a set of principals who wish to gain collective benefits, must address a common set of problems." These problems are "coping with free-riding, solving commitment problems, arranging for the supply of new institutions, and monitoring individual compliance with sets of rules." Ostrom found that groups that are able to organize and govern their behavior successfully are marked by the following design principles:
  1. Group boundaries are clearly defined.
  2. Rules governing the use of collective goods are well matched to local needs and conditions.
  3. Most individuals affected by these rules can participate in modifying the rules.
  4. The rights of community members to devise their own rules is respected by external authorities.
  5. A system for monitoring member's behavior exists; the community members themselves undertake this monitoring.
  6. A graduated system of sanctions is used.
  7. Community members have access to low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms.
  8. For CPRs that are parts of larger systems: appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.

12/25/11

Sharing Networks: Network dynamics can catalyze community trust faster

A 44-year-old woman in Helsinki, Finland, put it: “[If I designed a sharing service], it would work on network based on recommendations: I know you and you know someone, so you build trust—sort of ‘get introduced.’ Based on trust and community relationships, it’s easier to broaden one’s perspective towards sharing almost anything.”

Many people embrace the notion that sharing networks might complement or replace social institutions that have declined in power and importance. “What I'd want to set up is free sharing of services and stuff amongst a community of people in the way that a small town might once have functioned,” said one 38-year-old woman in Providence, RI. “I think this kind of interaction is part of community ties and support networks that used to develop naturally and spontaneously and need some encouragement now.”

Kim Gaskins of Latitude Research argues this creates “a huge opportunity for businesses to create the technological and community infrastructure that will help people to share in new ways, locally and across much broader distances, than was ever possible before.” And the really interesting thing is that this business activity may actually build social trust.

“There was a day when it would have seemed like a crazy idea to send your goods to people you had never met,” CouchSurfing founder Casey Fenton told us. “But [businesses like eBay] implemented different trust systems and it worked really well. And when you say it like that, people realize we have overcome the trust barrier through the CouchSurfing system. In fact, we are in the businesses of helping people understand just how trustworthy someone they have never met is. It is not our mission, but it is core to why we exist.”

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Building Social-Ecological Systems





Over many decades, Ostrom has documented how various communities manage common resources—grazing lands, forests, irrigation waters, fisheries—equitably and sustainably over the long term," wrote Jay Walljasper in Shareable.net. "The Nobel Committee’s recognition of her work effectively debunks popular theories about the Tragedy of the Commons, which hold that private property is the only effective method to prevent finite resources from being ruined or depleted."
According to Cooperation Commons (a great resource, by the way) Elinor Ostrom claims that "all efforts to organize collective action, whether by an external ruler, an entrepreneur, or a set of principals who wish to gain collective benefits, must address a common set of problems." These problems are "coping with free-riding, solving commitment problems, arranging for the supply of new institutions, and monitoring individual compliance with sets of rules."
In comparing communities, Ostrom found that groups that are able to organize and govern their behavior successfully are marked by the some basic design principles:
  • Group boundaries are clearly defined.
  • Rules governing the use of collective goods are well matched to local needs and conditions.
  • Most individuals affected by these rules can participate in modifying the rules.
  • The rights of community members to devise their own rules is respected by external authorities.
  • A system for monitoring member's behavior exists; the community members themselves undertake this monitoring.
  • A graduated system of sanctions is used.
  • Community members have access to low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms.
  • For common-pool resources that are parts of larger systems: appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.

Social media is catalyzing offline sharing


Shareable Magazine and Latitude Research's The New Sharing Economy study released today indicates that online sharing does indeed seem to encourage people to share offline resources such as cars and bikes, largely because they are learning to trust each other online. And they're not just sharing to save money - an equal number of people say they share to make the world a better place.
The research was prompted by a recent surge in sharing startups driven by social technology, a generational shift, and new consumption patternsbrought on by economic and environmental crisis. Two new books, What’s Mine is Yours: The Rise of Collaborative Consumption and The Mesh, argue that this trend is part of a fundamental shift from an ownership to an access economy. They document the rapid growth of the sector and its reach into an increasing number categories of shared use including office spacetravel accommodationstextbookskids clothesparking spacesgarden plotsprivate planescamera lensesluxury handbagsboatshousehold items, and more.


These new services offer citizens use of an asset without the burden of ownership. With a sharing economy comes the promise of cost savings, stronger communities, environmental conservation, broader access to resources, and higher quality products made for sharing. Sharing addresses many problems at once - an appropriate solution for an era of interconnected crises.


There are a number of helpful findings for sharing entrepreneurs including:
  • Sharing online content is a good predictor that someone is likely to share offline too. 78% of participants felt that experiences they've had interacting with people online have made them more open to the idea of sharing with strangers. In fact, every study participant who shared content online also shared various things offline. Sharing entrepreneurs are already taking advantage of this by seeding their services in contextually relevant online communities. For instance, online kids clothing exchange thredUP build relationships with prominent mommy bloggers to speed their launch.
  • 75% of participants predicted that their offline sharing will increase in the next 5 years. While fast growing, this new sector has lots of unmet demand. More than half of all participants either shared vehicles casually or expressed interest in doing so. Similarly, 62% of participants either share household items casually or expressed interest in doing so. There's also high interest in sharing of physical spaces for travel, storage, and work - even with complete strangers.
  • The most popular perceived benefits of sharing (67% each) were “saving money” and being “good for society,” echoing the “me+we” mentality popular amongst Millennials and offering insight on how to brand sharing services. People increasingly expect that saving money needn’t come at the expense of doing good, so gravitate to solutions like sharing that enable them to do both. In addition, two thirds of participants said they were more likely to share their belongings if they could make money from it. Brands should align with this "doing well by doing good" world view.
  • Car sharers share across significantly more categories than non-car sharers – 11 versus 8 categories. Ironically, the very thing that catalyzed consumer culture may be the vehicle into the sharing economy. Carsharing preceded the recent surge in sharing startups, and apparently car sharers are leading the behavior shift into a sharing economy. The finding suggests that once someone tries a sharing service they're more likely to begin sharing in other areas of their life. With this in mind, sharing enterprises would do well to seek partnerships with carsharing and like services, seek out users of other sharing services as new customers, and begin offering other items to share once established in a category.

12/23/11

Changing role of teachers in classroom

Grade 7 teacher Royan Lee is so committed to making learning collaborative, he won’t call himself a teacher, preferring the moniker “lead learner.”

He sees himself as guiding his English and math students at Beverley Acres Public School in Richmond Hill, Ont., in a space where they don’t just do the usual group work, but constantly think together and critique each other.

His classroom is profoundly social and virtually paperless. Laptops, tablets, and smartphones – some belonging to pupils, some supplied by the school – link each learner to Web-based spaces where everyone interacts, not just the bold few who would have dared to raise a hand.

At times, Mr. Lee will pose questions such as, “Look at this picture: what equivalent fractions do you see?” and the pupils tackle them together in chat rooms or multimedia Web forums. They have also experimented with a Twitter-based “back channel,” an ongoing stream of pupils’ feedback and questions projected at the front of the class.

Even individual work is shared: Pupils submit assignments, notes and thoughts to networked personal blogs, forming digital portfolios they can all see and comment on.

“We try to learn out in the open,” Mr. Lee says. “[My pupils] feel like they can’t achieve the heights they want to without one another. … It’s almost a method of crowd-sourcing understanding.”

The key is less what students learn than how they learn it: The Googles of the world have decentralized knowledge, meaning the teacher’s role is now much more about helping students assess information and apply it.

The Wieman Initiative changed [the teacher's] mind when it linked him with a science teaching and learning fellow to help him transform his upper-year optical physics course.

He started assigning the raw materials to be absorbed as homework, as well as short online quizzes before class to keep students doing the readings. In class, he presented students with activities and problems, had them split up any way they wished to solve them together, and offered help where it was needed.

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12/9/11

Starlings: A Beautiful Emergent Behavior Example

Murmuration from Sophie Windsor Clive on Vimeo.

Triumph of the Commons featured on The Daily Heller


Triumph of the Commons is featured on today's Daily Heller. Thanks to Steven Heller for highlighting the work of so many great artists:

Nikolay Saveliev, Michael Schwab, Jan Wilker, Ed Fella, Serifcan Ozcan, Erik Yang, Michael Rock, Jason Musante, Thomas Porostocky, Thomas Wilder, Jakob Trollback, Amy Wang, Allen Hori, Dora and Maja Christina Nizar, Tim Goodman, Karin Soukup, Jiyun Ha, Milan Zrnic, Matteo Bologna, Isidro Ferrer, Nick Law,Sumayya Alsenan, Rebeca Mendez, Simon Johnston, Brian Roettinger, Josh Smith, Bryan Collins, Kevin Brainard/Darren Cox, Woody Pirtle, John Bielenberg, Matt Luckhurst, Jeff Rogers, Brad Bartlett, Gail Anderson, Steve Haslip, Dana Tanamachi, Ji Lee, Eric Hu, Seth Mroczka, LaurieRosenwald, James Victore, Erin Wahed, Noreen Morioka, Jennifer Kinon, Rick/Jess Boyko, Sean Adams, Jessica Hische, Nick Ace, David Ricart, Seymour Chwast, Bobby Martin, Nancy Vonk, Gustavo Cordova

12/5/11

Betray the Age

“If you want to serve the age, betray it.”
Irish poet Brendan Kennelly

12/4/11

The Free Market Freefall: Why China Can Teach us Something

Andy Grove, the founder and chairman of Intel, provocatively wrote in Businessweek last year that, "Our fundamental economic beliefs, which we have elevated from a conviction based on observation to an unquestioned truism, is that the free market is the best of all economic systems—the freer the better. Our generation has seen the decisive victory of free-market principles over planned economies. So we stick with this belief largely oblivious to emerging evidence that while free markets beat planned economies, there may be room for a modification that is even better."

The past few weeks have proven Mr. Grove's point, as our relations with China, and that country's impact on America's future, came to the forefront of American politics. Our inert Senate, while preparing for the super committee to fail, crossed the normally insurmountable political divide to pass legislation to address China's currency manipulation. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, former Gov. Mitt Romney and President Barack Obama all weighed in with their views—ranging from warnings that China must "end unfair discrimination" (Mrs. Clinton) to complaints that the U.S. has "been played like a fiddle" (Mr. Romney) and that China needs to stop "gaming" the international system (Mr. Obama).

As this was happening, I was part of a U.S.-China dialogue—a trip organized by the China-United States Exchange Foundation and the Center for American Progress—with high-ranking Chinese government officials, both past and present. For me, the tension resulting from the chorus of American criticism paled in significance compared to reading the emerging outline of China's 12th five-year plan. The aims: a 7% annual economic growth rate; a $640 billion investment in renewable energy; construction of six million homes; and expanding next-generation IT, clean-energy vehicles, biotechnology, high-end manufacturing and environmental protection—all while promoting social equity and rural development.

Some Americans are drawing lessons from this. Last month, the China Daily quoted Orville Schell, who directs the Center on U.S.-China Relations at the Asia Society, as saying: "I think we have come to realize the ability to plan is exactly what is missing in America." The article also noted that Robert Engle, who won a Nobel Prize in 2003 for economics, has said that while China is making five-year plans for the next generation, Americans are planning only for the next election.

The world has been made "flat" by the technological miracles of Andy Grove, Steve Jobs and Bill Gates. This has forced all institutions to confront what is clearly the third economic revolution in world history. The Agricultural Revolution was a roughly 3,000-year transition, the Industrial Revolution lasted 300 years, and this technology-led Global Revolution will take only 30-odd years. No single generation has witnessed so much change in a single lifetime.

The current debates about China's currency, the trade imbalance, our debt and China's excessive use of pirated American intellectual property are evidence that the Global Revolution—coupled with Deng Xiaoping's government-led, growth-oriented reforms—has created the planet's second-largest economy. It's on a clear trajectory to knock America off its perch by 2025.

As Andy Grove so presciently articulated in the July 1, 2010, issue of Businessweek, the economies of China, Singapore, Germany, Brazil and India have demonstrated "that a plan for job creation must be the number-one objective of state economic policy; and that the government must play a strategic role in setting the priorities and arraying the forces of organization necessary to achieve this goal."

The conservative-preferred, free-market fundamentalist, shareholder-only model—so successful in the 20th century—is being thrown onto the trash heap of history in the 21st century. In an era when countries need to become economic teams, Team USA's results—a jobless decade, 30 years of flat median wages, a trade deficit, a shrinking middle class and phenomenal gains in wealth but only for the top 1%—are pathetic.

This should motivate leaders to rethink, rather than double down on an empirically failing free-market extremism. As painful and humbling as it may be, America needs to do what a once-dominant business or sports team would do when the tide turns: study the ingredients of its competitors' success.

While we debate, Team China rolls on. Our delegation witnessed China's people-oriented development in Chongqing, a city of 32 million in Western China, which is led by an aggressive and popular Communist Party leader—Bo Xilai. A skyline of cranes are building roughly 1.5 million square feet of usable floor space daily—including, our delegation was told, 700,000 units of public housing annually.

Meanwhile, the Chinese government can boast that it has established in Western China an economic zone for cloud computing and automotive and aerospace production resulting in 12.5% annual growth and 49% growth in annual tax revenue, with wages rising more than 10% a year.

For those of us who love this country and believe America has every asset it needs to remain the No. 1 economic engine of the world, it is troubling that we have no plan—and substitute a demonization of government and worship of the free market at a historical moment that requires a rethinking of both those beliefs.

America needs to embrace a plan for growth and innovation, with a streamlined government as a partner with the private sector. Economic revolutions require institutions to change and maybe make history, because if they stick to the status quo they soon become history. Our great country, which sparked and wants to lead this global revolution, needs a forward looking, long-term economic plan.

The imperative for change is simple. As Andy Grove pointed out: "If we want to remain a leading economy, we change on our own, or change will continue to be forced upon us."

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